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Our colleague, media scholar James Curran, he of the book, Power Without Responsibility, 
inquired in 1994 about early post-apartheid changes in South Africa.  After hearing a litany of 
complaints he simply retorted:  “Democracy is merely the most efficient way of managing 
corruption. Nothing more, nothing less”.  This comment revealed a flaw in Western thinking 
about enforcing democracy across the world – namely, in places where people vote ethnically or 
racially, democracy actually creates institutionalized corruption.  And so our unrealistic hopes, 
our idealistic expectations that somehow we in South Africa would create a perfect society have 
all but vanished.  Now ageing ex-United Democratic Front (UDF) activists huddle in dark corners 
talking about the “failed state”, what could have been, what once was when we had actively 
contributed to a UDF-led partial democracy – if only in the sphere of resistance. This was an 
indeterminate time in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the UDF had created liberated urban 
spaces, when leaders earned respect and support by hard constituency work, and when street 
committees ensured civil safety.  This was a time when the alternative presses were democratic, 
participatory, and when they acted as local or sectoral fulcrums of democracy (see Tomasalli and 
Louw 1991). The notion of ‘accountability’ was the supreme discipline  for UDF-supporting anti-
apartheid collectives (and sometimes a threat also). 
 
This was a time when popular leaders and alterative press editors like Trevor Manual, later a 
Minister of Finance, had worked hard to earn consent of the governed, mobilised through 
community newspapers like Grassroots in the Western Cape to create the local fulcrums of 
democracy and an emergent public sphere.  This was a time when we understood how media and 
cultural mobilisation helped us to identify, develop, and create a national project.  This was a time 
when the foundations of media freedom and party-political media policies were laid, only to be 
later squandered, and lost in the state’s adoption of a whole slew of media management and 
secrecy bills, many of them far more draconian than anything that had been enacted during 
apartheid.  
Everyone wanted to be witness to a post-apartheid "miracle", and in the 1990s a number of 
activists wrote about the hard work through which it was achieved (see, e.g., Taylor 1996).  
Debates on media policy were intensive (see Louw 1993;   Mpofu et al 1996; Jabulani 1991).  But 
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just ten years later, the miracle had gone sour.   One of the reasons is that for many years too 
many people looked the other way and/or became silent as the ruling African National Congress 
(ANC) slipped into poor and often, corrupt, nepotistic and brutal governance.   
Why was silence the predominant response?  This is the question that this article addresses.   
This paper seeks to identify competing discourses and patterns of behaviour within South 
Africa’s print media in its general reporting on the transition to power by the new African 
National Congress (ANC)-led government following the first democratic general election 
held in April 1994. A range of sources are used including media stories and websites. 
Stories (drawn from the full spectrum of media sources) are used to identify broad 
patterns of behaviour.  But in addition, all political organizations now put up on their 
websites full speeches, policy documents and media releases.  These proved during the 
course of our research to offer a gold mine of information about discourse formation and 
the competition between the various discourses that characterize contemporary South 
Africa.   
Another important source of information is You Tube where a range of political players 
and media now regularly post material.  You Tube also transmits expressions of popular 
culture including political songs by Julius Malema, Jacob Zuma, Steve Hofmeyr and Bok 
van Blerk – who represent different ideological positions. The Internet has, of course, 
also become an important space for the circulation of political memes, jokes and attacks 
on opponents.  These can be extraordinarily revealing about the mood of different sectors 
of society.  When taken as a whole they tell us much about the political struggles taking 
place. Another important source of insights was the use of journalistic vox pops – i.e., 
simply asking people about their views.  But when using vox pops it is necessarily 
important to speak to a wide range of people so as to ensure one reaches a full 
demographic spread of regions, class, age, race, ethnicity and educational level.  All of 
these methods of information retrieval were applied to piece together a phenomenological 
feel for the discursive shifts that characterize an ever-changing South African social and 
political milieu. 
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The Miracle and Improvising the Nation 
The early 1990s witnessed an extraordinary event as all parties to then formation of the future 
state engaged in extensive negotiations via CODESSA, the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa.  Policy, politics, visions and missions were debated, published and circulated.  The key 
issues were how to negotiate the competing Afrikaner and black nationalisms, how to bring the 
civil war to a close, and how to incorporate everyone and all groups into a still to be formed 
unified nation – geographically, politically and administratively.    The apartheid homelands were 
to be re-incorporated into this unification, which proved difficult because of resistance from 
apartheid made nationalisms – for example, long after whites had given up on apartheid, Zulu and 
Tswana nationalist sought on to maintain the system.  In Benedict Anderson’s (1983) terms, the 
‘nation’ had yet to be ‘imagined’, and Alexander Johnston’s (2014) question was,  ‘how could 
nation be ‘improvised’.  CODESSA provided both sites in that a new nation was imagined and 
codified in a constitution, while an initially neo-liberal state was improvised to manage the 
transition under President Nelson Mandela. 
It was during Thabo Mbeki presidency (1998-2004) that the nation was re-imagined via a 
recovery of a racial path dependency that elevated black African nationalism over non-racialism, 
and which in attempting to redress economic disparities actually exacerbated them (Moletsi 
Mbeki 2009). The improvised nation that was imagined in 1990s was re-articulated after 2000 
into race-based demographic labour and economic planning model, though much more benign 
than was apartheid.  
The trans-class, trans-race, trans-cultural and trans-linguistic UDF alliance of the 1980s 
mutated by 2000 into the ANC’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy that 
sought to transfer wealth from whites to an emergent black bourgeoisie whose 
membership of the ruling ANC qualified them for rapid class mobility.  Black wealth, as 
Moeletsi Mbeki (1999) observes, was not to be created by black entrepreneurs, but was to 
be legislated.  This took two specific forms:  a) transfer of 51% shareholding to 
politically connected black business people (the amaBEE);  b) deployment of ANC 
cadres to the massive parastatal companies as CEOs, board members and top 
appointments, irrespective of their qualifications, experience and ability to manage these 
multi-billion dollar state-owned firms in transport, electricity, telephony, broadcasting 
etc.  While the situation is much more complex than this, this is the background to the 
points made below.   
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How 'the miracle' was lost 
In hindsight, the media may have been part of the problem that best the newly forming state from 
1994. President Thabo Mbeki’s consolidation of the ANC’s hegemony was paralleled by media 
that traded on the miracle, which appeared to have protected capitalism and seen off socialism. 
Just as the SA Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) had been allegedly ‘His Master’s Voice’ under 
the National Party, so the Corporation returned to this role under Mbeki, and consolidated under 
Zuma who ousted Mbeki as President.  But where previously the SABC had promoted apartheid 
ideology, under Mbeki it promoted black nationalist ideology.  The SABC even compiled an 
editorial blacklist of persons with views unacceptable to Mbeki (Louw & Milton, 2012: 290). 
This list included black considered hostile to the new elite 
When the ANC came to power in April 1994 both the English and Afrikaans press fell in behind 
Mandela. Mandela became a ‘media darling’ – someone the media eulogized rather than 
scrutinized.  Editors initially adopted the attitude that South Africa’s political transformation was 
very fragile; they thus conferred an inexperienced ANC government a chance to stabilize a 
political system that could easily disintegrate. As a consequence, the press largely abandoned its 
watchdog role in favour of a curious form of sunshine journalism.  
‘Give them a chance’ journalism meant that few, initially reported on government 
mismanagement, corruption, patronage and service delivery failures, or on the ANC failure to 
deliver on their election promises.  This ‘give them a chance’ journalism became a habit and 
characterised the press’ coverage of the ANC for well over a decade.  Now, ironically, many of 
the highly positioned politicians then praised by the press as democrats are now leading the 
charge against media freedom. The resultant sunshine journalism was given a boost by Mbeki’s 
policy shift to the Growth, Empowerment and Redistribution (GEAR) economic intervention, 
because this shift facilitated the forging of links between ANC crony capitalists and the white 
dominated business sector.  This translated into liberal press approval of ANC ‘moderation’.    
Mbeki thus found himself in an enviable position – he did not face much watchdog scrutiny from 
the press except for his bizarre stance on HIV/AIDS (Tomaselli 2011), while at the same time he 
set about controlling the most viewed (public) broadcaster in the county.   Ironically, what 
journalistic scrutiny there was came from media organizations that were broadly aligned with the 
ANC – namely the (social democrat) Mail & Guardian, the free-to-air e.tv and a number of black 
consciousness columnists writing for the corporate, but now union-owned press (Tomaselli 
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1997).  The latter, operating somewhat as an internal opposition, became the most consistent 
media-voice asking critical questions of ANC governance, with e.tv probing governance from a 
broadly left-wing advocacy perspective. 
The end of ‘give them a chance’ journalism 
 
In 2004 Mbeki and his ANC-government looked securely ensconced within what had become a 
one party dominant democracy (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999;  Johnston 2014).  However, after 
2005 the ANC experienced five years of ongoing deterioration in its media image which began 
with media reporting of the Schabir Shaik corruption/fraud trial, not to mention the press’s 
sustained criticism on HIV policy.  By 2010 media coverage of the ANC was so negative that 
Zuma’s government realised that something needed to be done to prevent a full scale exposure of 
state mismanagement and corruption.  The ANC’s response was to introduce the Protection of 
State Information Bill into Parliament in March 2010. 
 
By 2008 neither the English nor the Afrikaans Press, whether white or black-owned, were 
showing any tolerance towards errors made by the ANC-government. So whereas betweeb 1994 
an  2004 the ANC-government faced minimal scrutiny because the press gave the ANC a chance 
to stabilize a fragile system; after 2008 both the ANC (and its leadership) faced intense press 
scrutiny.  This shift to press scrutiny and watchdog journalism occurred in two stages.  
 
After 2005, the Afrikaans press abandoned sunshine journalism following an ANC announcement 
that Pretoria was to be renamed Tshwane. This unleashed a wave of Afrikaner resentment and 
hostility towards the ANC-government best exemplified by the De la Rey phenomenon. De la 
Rey was a Boer War general (1899-1901) whose mythical anti-imperialist image was ironically 
leveraged by a number of dissident Afrikaner musicians to remind the current government about 
the dangers of racial discrimination and cultural marginalisation.  As one Afrikaans newspaper 
editor, Tim Du Plessis (2007) noted,   a “gear shift” towards being more vocal and assertive 
occurred. For the Zuma-government the key fallout from the Pretoria/De la Rey phenomenon was 
the change it triggered in the Afrikaans press – effectively after 2005 it switched to watchdog 
journalism. Because the Afrikaans press is read by what is effectively a marginal but financially 
powerful group, this press shift did not generate a crisis for the Zuma government.  In 2008, 
however, the introduction of electricity rationing resulted in the English-liberal press also 
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abandoning the ‘give them a chance’ genre of journalism. This was much more serious for the 
ANC because English is South Africa’s dominant media language, and the language of the polity.   
 
Once the English-liberal press also adopted  a watchdog ‘attack’ mode of journalism the 
government found itself facing unprecedented levels of journalistic scrutiny. But the real 
catastrophe for Zuma was that this switch back towards watchdog journalism coincided with the 
fractious struggles taking place inside what is known as the tripartite alliance comprising the 
ANC, SA Communist Party and Congress of SA Trade Unions.  This led to waves of leaked 
stories to both the English and Afrikaans presses from horrendously ill-disciplined cadres in the 
alliance. Try as he might, Zuma proved unable to curtail the struggles or the leaking.  One reason 
these fractious struggles became so problematic was because the ANC’s style of governance was 
based upon a model of ‘cadre deployment’.  
 
In effect, Mbeki had developed a style of governance grounded in patronage – wherein ANC 
members were ‘deployed’ to all state and economic positions as a strategy to: (i) ensure that 
ANC-aligned blacks took control of South Africa; (ii) to ‘reward’ loyal party members and (iii) to 
co-opt (and tame) any members of the tripartite-coalition showing unhappiness with policy-
directions.  As a consequence, ANC political appointees had become widely dispersed throughout 
the entire state infrastructure (central, provincial and municipal governments); and in hundreds of 
massive state owned enterprises (parastatals), many of them deemed to be of  strategic national 
importance (SA Broadcasting Corporation; Electricity supply, Eskom;  SA Airways end railways 
etc.).  The problem for Zuma was that as the ANC and its partners uncompromisingly disputed 
each other in public, so all these deployed cadres from the different patronage-networks and 
fractions leaked stories about each other (often involving corruption) to the media.  As a 
consequence, the Zuma government looked increasingly dysfunctional as “bad news” flooded out 
of the alliance.  
 
By 2010 media coverage of the ANC was so consistently negative that Zuma’s government 
decided to stop the leaking.  Protection of State Information Bill was geared to dramatically 
curtail the ability of South African journalists to expose governance problems.  
 
The silences that harmed South Africa 
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There are a range of reasons that issues can be taken off the agenda for public debate – including 
fear, politeness, self-censorship, political correctness and full censorship. Post-apartheid South 
Africa may not yet have experienced full censorship, but it certainly experienced a curtailed 
debate under Mbeki’s tenure because too many issues became unmentionable (except in private).   
Some of the issues that fell off the agenda during the first decade of ANC rule are discussed 
below. 
Perhaps most importantly was the emergence of a new elite – an elite born of an ANC-run system 
of state-driven patronage. This elite goes by many names, including the Gucci comrades; the 
patriotic black bourgeoisie; and the amaBEE (Black Economic Empowerment). The latter is 
accused of lacking self-reliance and of creating a sense of entitlement, dependency and laziness 
(Maponya 11 in Sunday Times Business Times, December 9, 2012).  Moletsi Mbeki (2009), 
Thabo’s brother, is much harsher, arguing that that BEE – which requires that companies be 51%  
black-owned has created a small, self-serving rentier class of high earners who became 
billionaires literally overnight.  In this guise, the new elite ‘consumes’ capital on a vast scale 
while the traditionally ‘white’ economic sector continues to produce it. This new amaBEE class 
and its crass materialism is visible in all South African cities and has generated a sense of 
cynicism and anger about this elite amongst the non-elite (both black and white).  
 
The problem for South Africa is that this new elite has proven to be inept because one of the 
unintended consequence of the ANC’s ‘transformation’ policies (of affirmative action, black 
empowerment and cadre deployment) has been widespread organisational inefficiency and 
corruption across the entire state sector at every level of government:  national, provincial and 
municipal.  As former director general in the Presidency, Frank Chikane, concluded about the 
post-1994 transformation programme, the ANC retrenched experienced public servants and 
replaced them with unqualified people. Chikane noted how this had “led to the collapse of the 
public service” (anon, 2012). The result has been: 
  
 a service-delivery crisis across the country 
 the government that fails to deliver on its election promises 
 the emergence of a corrupt black elite which has become increasingly unresponsive to the 
grassroots community, and 
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 the breakdown of police and judicial services which had left all South Africans vulnerable to 
rampant crime,  
 
So why was there silence as this elite was brought into being? 
 
In the first few years of ANC rule it occurred because of the Mandela effect – Mandela as ‘media 
darling’ was above media scrutiny and this rubbed off onto the wider ANC machine.  Then, when 
the ANC embraced neo-liberalism (by adopting GEAR), one could almost hear the sigh of relief 
from both the English and Afrikaans presses which historically had represented these two 
different ethnic fractions of capital.  The dropping of the RDP (Reconstruction and Development 
Policy) in 1997 and its replacement with GEAR was a highly significant ANC policy-change, 
signalling a shift from neo-socialism to neo-liberalism. Naturally, once the ANC adopted GEAR 
they were viewed as ‘moderates’ and this translated into a new version of the ‘media darling’ 
effect.  The Brenthurst group of businessmen were, of course delighted with GEAR – because it 
was a vindication of all the resources the white South African business sector had invested in the 
Urban Foundation since the 1970s – a reformist project to create a pro-capitalist black middle 
class that could become the new (post-apartheid) ruling group (Louw, 2004: 69).  For the old 
white elite, creating a new ‘moderate’ black elite was precisely what they had intended and so 
they supported the ANC’s transformation policies as the quickest way to stabilize South Africa.  
 
When the transformation process delivered a black nationalist triumphalism and race populism 
they turned the other cheek, and when transformation delivered an inexperienced and inefficient 
elite they looked the other way, assuming that it would get better in due course. But it did not get 
better.  Eventually, after a decade, patience with this elite ran out. Yet this only occurred when 
the now not-so-new elite began to claw at each other’s throats in factional disputes – disputes that 
exacerbated the already visible outcomes of poor governance seen in the shape of crime, 
corruption, gangs, warlords, gated communities, private security, xenophobia (generated by a 
flood of illegal migrants), the emigration of skilled professionals, and a falling currency.  
But there was also another set of reasons that the ANC was not challenged for so many years.  
This was because the ANC emerged from the anti-apartheid struggle with two great assets – 
firstly, a competent spin-machine and secondly, huge amounts of goodwill.  The ANC used its 
spin-machine plus the goodwill of liberals, social democrats, the global and South African 
business elite, and the global media to successfully disseminate a plethora of positive publicity.    
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ANC spin – obfuscation and deflecting attention 
For their first decade in power the ANC evidenced much skill in hiding the inadequacies of their 
governance by generating ‘noise’ that ‘distracted’ journalists, academics and commentators alike, 
and which successfully ‘deflected attention’ away from the problems of the transformation model 
they were rolling out.   
The noise generated by the ANC took five forms.  
Firstly, during the 1990s the ANC produced beautifully written policies, codes and laws. Often 
these were produced with the aid of the OECD’s (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) policy transfer industry – an industry that dispatched reconstruction missions to 
places like Southern Africa and Eastern Europe to teach the native in such places how to behave 
in accordance with liberal-democratic values.  As a result of codifying such well written policies, 
codes and laws, post-apartheid South Africa became the poster-child of OECD academics, 
journalists and governments for over a decade.  The problem is good policies, codes and laws 
become mere window-dressing if inept bureaucracies and poor governance prevent these from 
actually being implemented. 
Secondly, the ANC hid behind the discourses of "democracy", "majoritariansim" and 
"transformation".  These terms became useful rhetorical devises that were deployed as forms of 
neo-religious incantation. Like motherhood, they became inviolable – after all, how could any 
reasonable person disagree with such ideals.  The trouble is, these discourses in the hands of ANC 
spin doctors effectively became anti-democratic because they shut down debate  – they  were 
used to silence anyone who wanted to draw attention to the actual realities of implementing 
‘majoritarian-democracy’ and ‘ANC transformation’.  Alternative voices could simply be 
dismissed as ‘unreasonable’ and so a strange kind of uni-dimensionality took hold of South 
African politics.   
Third (and related to the above), critics of the ANC’s policies were accused of, ‘resisting 
transformation’ or being ‘counter-revolutionary’, and if they happened to be non-black were 
accused of being ‘racist’.  Playing the race card constituted the kiss of death for those targeted, 
and rendered the vast majority of the non-black population effectively voiceless and 
disempowered. In essence, the ANC used language as an anti-democratic weapon at the very time 
that the world was proclaiming the miracle of South Africa’s transformation to “democracy”.   
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The ANC proved to be very adept at playing these rhetorical games. The impact of deploying 
these rhetorical weapons was highly damaging to the public sphere and contributed greatly to the 
silencing of opposition, which in turn helped to create precisely the conditions required for the 
emergence of an inept and corrupt ruling elite.  
Fourth, the ANC learned to play the Mandela card.  The world’s media had turned Mandela into a 
“saint” (see Tomaselli and Shepperson 2009).   While President he was literally positioned above 
and beyond politics – an untouchable whose government could not be scrutinised.  The problem 
is, a strong element of this lack of journalistic scrutiny continued beyond Mandela’s presidency – 
so that the ‘Party of Mandela’ and its policies seemed to somehow remain ‘beyond question’ for a 
long time after his retirement.  
Fifth, the ANC successfully used various versions of the “victimhood discourse” to explain away 
the failures of its policies.  The three most widely used “victimhood discourses” were to blame 
apartheid, to blame colonialism, or to blame white racism. The ANC became very skilled at 
mobilizing these three discourses which were, of course, all intermeshed with the view of the 
world generated by black nationalism.  It was a world view that offered excuses for poor 
governance.  Consequently, the ANC did not take ownership of their own failings or the failings 
of their constituencies.  The repairing of structural failure was thus not on the agenda.  
Because the “victimhood discourse” effectively blamed whites (i.e. “the advantaged” or “the 
previously advantaged”) for everything that was wrong in South Africa it served to silence whites 
from drawing attention to ANC failures because to do so made the white person concerned into a 
double victimizer of ‘black-as-victims’(“the disadvantaged” or “the previously disadvantaged”)  
of a ‘shameful past’.  This proved to be very helpful for a government that was failing to deliver 
because it simultaneously (i) blamed whites; (ii) said whites should feel guilty; (iii) labelled 
whites who did not adopt the ‘guilty script’ as ‘racists’; (iv) cowered whites into silence; (v) 
excused all manner of poor behaviour from “the previously disadvantaged”; (vi) provided an 
inbuilt excuse for the construction of a state-run patronage system (affirmative action and black 
empowerment); and (vii) put the logic of the black nationalist ‘victimhood discourse’ beyond’ 
discussion.  One of the silences this produced was around the question of black nationalism.  
Black nationalism became effectively unchallengeable so that nobody, for example felt free to ask 
the question why black nationalism is acceptable but Afrikaner nationalism is deemed to have 
been illegitimate?    
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And so, majoritarianism was borne.   Democracy was no longer about debating policies, the 
protection of minorities within broader ideological confluences; the media was no longer about 
the integrity of the public sphere, and the nature of patronage did not change from one 
government to the next – except, of course, that the state houses built in Soweto in the 1950s on a 
garden city template – have been augmented with new houses built after 1994 that barely last for 
three months before falling apart, on estates that are soulless and planning bereft.   
 
Apartheid racial classification continues.  Where the UDF truly was a non-racial organisation, the 
ANC is obsessed with race, multiple shades of black and ‘foreigners, Africans from the rest of 
Africa.   Xenophobia, demonisation and exclusion are the experiences of  the later two categories.   
Equity legislation, for example, requires that Cape Coloureds move to other parts of the country 
where they are demographically ‘under-represented’ if they want jobs.  Coloureds in Durban are 
told that Cape Coloureds will get preferential treatment for jobs in Durban (where coloureds are 
supposedly under-represented.)  The indigenous San Bushman resent being called ‘coloureds’.  
Indian South Africans are discriminated against in Durban because they are ‘over-represented’ in 
this province.   Official forms exclude the rest of the world:  only ‘Africans, Whites, Coloureds 
and Indians’ exist, in descending order of population size.  Such forms refuse to accept that an 
‘African’ might speak French, Swahili or Arabic as a home language.  The only languages that 
can be ticked on official forms are the 11 official ones. 
 
Thus has SA parochialised itself all over again.  Different period, same issues.  New government 
same classifications.  The result is what Franz Fanon (1962: 122) calls “false decolonisation’, and 
what John Saul (2012: 593) terms “Liberation Lite”. 
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